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THE PARADOX OF POLITICAL POWER: POST-RACIALISM, 
EQUAL PROTECTION, AND DEMOCRACY 
William M. Carter, Jr.* 
[A] reasonable jury could easily find that the City’s real 
reason . . . was . . . a simple desire to please a politically important 
racial constituency. 
 —Ricci v. DeStefano1 
Democracy is premised on responsiveness. 
 —Citizens United v. FEC2 
INTRODUCTION 
Racial minorities have enjoyed increasing electoral success in recent years, 
while continuing to rank at or near the bottom in terms of health, wealth, 
income, education, and the effects of the criminal justice system.3 Some 
observers, including some members of the Supreme Court, have pointed to 
evidence of isolated electoral success as proof of “post-racialism,” while 
ignoring the evidence of substantial continued disparities for the vast majority 
of people of color. 
This Essay will examine the tension between repeated calls for racial 
minorities to achieve their goals through the political process and the Supreme 
Court’s increasingly restrictive “colorblind,” or “post-racial,” jurisprudence, 
 
 * Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. This Essay benefited greatly from 
the comments and critiques I received at the Law and Society Association’s 2011 Annual Meeting and at the 
Constitutional Law Colloquium organized by Mark Tushnet of Harvard Law School during the American 
Constitution Society’s 2011 National Convention. I would also like to thank Mike Lizerbram for his research 
assistance. This Essay is dedicated to my nieces and nephew, Alissa, Brianna, and William (“Tre”) Snoddy. 
Know that your dreams are always within reach and that you can change the world. Do not let it change you. 
 1 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2688 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 2 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
 3 See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 982–92 (2010) 
(surveying statistical data indicating continued racial disparities along many measures of economic and social 
success); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
803, 806–07 (2004) (same). This is not to suggest that racial minorities have not achieved substantial gains 
relative to earlier times. See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America’s Prisons, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 791, 793 n.15 (2011) (citing statistics showing improvements in a variety of material 
conditions for African-Americans since the Civil Rights Era). 
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which severely limits the circumstances in which racial minorities can 
effectively exercise their political power once it has been attained. Examples 
include City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., where the Court struck down an 
affirmative action program adopted by a majority-black city council;4 Ricci v. 
DeStefano, where black and Latino residents of New Haven successfully 
lobbied the City of New Haven to discard a test for promotions in the fire 
department because the test resulted in substantial exclusion of racial 
minorities, only to have the City’s action struck down by the Court;5 and 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder 
(NAMUDNO), where the renewal of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act passed 
the House and Senate by overwhelming margins, only to have its 
constitutionality strongly questioned by the Supreme Court.6 
This Essay argues that the Court’s suspicion of the exercise of minority 
political power will only increase as its post-racial jurisprudence accelerates. 
For racial minorities, the countermajoritarian difficulty is likely to become 
much more difficult. 
I. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY AND POST-RACIALISM 
For decades, scholars have attempted to resolve the “countermajoritarian 
difficulty”: the proper role of an unelected federal judiciary in mediating 
conflicts between majority rule and minority rights.7 The primary justification 
for heightened judicial scrutiny of government action disadvantaging certain 
minority groups has been the “process-defect” rationale.8 Declaring elected 
officials’ actions unconstitutional is, of course, always antidemocratic in a 
“thin” sense.9 Doing so is nonetheless considered justified with regard to laws 
 
 4 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 5 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 6 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
 7 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 16 (Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1986) (1962) (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system.”). 
 8 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (noting that “prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may . . . tend[] seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,” thereby requiring “a correspondingly more searching 
judicial inquiry” in such cases); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–79 (1980) (discussing process-defect theory as a reason for judicial intervention on 
behalf of minorities). 
 9 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional 
Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 936 (2001) (questioning the premise of the countermajoritarian difficulty 
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burdening certain minority groups because they are presumed to be unable to 
fully protect their interests through the political process, due to their numerical 
disadvantages, the majority’s aversion to them or their interests, and histories 
of prejudice and subordination.10 In other words, the judiciary helps those who 
cannot help themselves. 
Critics have long suggested, however, that the Supreme Court has too often 
engaged in judicial activism, i.e., that it has too often acted in 
countermajoritarian ways. Many disputes, it is argued, would be better 
resolved through the political process than in the courts.11 Even with regard to 
racial discrimination, conservatives in particular have argued that advocates of 
racial equality too often rely upon judicial, rather than political, remedies.12 
Simultaneously, post-racialism has become the dominant cultural narrative 
regarding racial inequality.13 Post-racialism posits that racial minorities’ 
societal gains combined with the presumed absence of contemporary 
discrimination against them render measures explicitly aimed at redressing 
racial inequality both unnecessary and counterproductive. It is argued that such 
measures cause, rather than cure, racial divisiveness and resentment.14 The 
 
and arguing that judicial review “yields remarkably majoritarian results[] and is a process that is different from 
majoritarian politics but nonetheless responsive to it”). 
 10 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating that laws 
classifying on the basis of race, alienage, and national origin are subject to strict scrutiny because “[t]hese 
factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such 
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy” and “because such discrimination is unlikely to 
be soon rectified by legislative means”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) 
(stating that strict scrutiny should only apply when the class at issue is “saddled with such disabilities, or 
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”). 
 11 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority 
for striking down a Texas law criminalizing homosexual conduct but stating that he “ha[s] nothing against 
homosexuals, or any other group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic means”). 
 12 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (“[The petitioner’s] arguments are best 
presented to the legislative bodies. It is not the responsibility—or indeed even the right—of this Court to 
determine the appropriate punishment for particular crimes. It is the legislatures, the elected representatives of 
the people, that are ‘constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.’” 
(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (per curiam))). 
 13 See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009) (describing post-racialism as 
reflecting the “belief that due to the significant racial progress that has been made, the state need not engage in 
race-based decision-making or adopt race-based remedies, and that civil society should eschew race as a 
central organizing principle of social action”). 
 14 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that affirmative action programs “engender attitudes of superiority 
or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the 
government’s use of race”). 
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post-racialist worldview holds that very little discrimination against minorities 
occurs today, that any discrimination that does occur is aberrational, and that 
adopting remedial measures to combat the actions of a few bigots is a cure 
worse than the disease.15 
This Essay, while addressing both post-racialism and countermajoritarian 
criticisms of judicial action protecting racial minorities, does not attempt to 
resolve those debates. Rather, my primary goal is to illuminate the dangers of 
what I believe to be a coming convergence between those two ideas in 
constitutional doctrine and discourse. If post-racialism is assumed to be 
descriptively accurate, then racial minorities should be able to achieve their 
goals through the political process, rather than through the courts. And if the 
countermajoritarian critique has force in this context, then it is preferable that 
they do so. 
The Court’s decisions therefore seek to push racial minorities away from 
vindicating their goals in the courts and toward doing so through the political 
process. For example, the Court’s equal protection doctrine requires proof of 
subjective discriminatory intent on the part of an identifiable government actor 
to trigger heightened judicial scrutiny.16 This requirement means that the Equal 
Protection Clause will be unavailing as a remedy for any but the most 
egregious and obvious instances of racial discrimination and inequality. 
Procedural hurdles compound the litigation-discouraging effect of the Court’s 
substantive equal protection doctrine. For example, the Court’s recent 
decisions requiring greater factual specificity in pleading federal civil claims 
mean that, in addition to the difficulties in proving subjective discriminatory 
 
 15 Both of the premises described above are subject to contestation on normative and descriptive grounds. 
Whether it would be better for remedies for racial inequality to be achieved through the political process than 
through the courts depends upon what we mean by “better”: faster, more effective, more permanent, etc. As for 
post-racialism, the prescriptive power of its major premise—that we should less often explicitly seek racial 
justice—is dependent to a large degree on the descriptive force of its minor premises. If more racial 
discrimination exists than post-racialists would have us believe, or if one believes that individual instances of 
bigotry are only part of racial injustice, or if post-racialists overestimate the divisiveness that measures 
addressing racial inequality cause, then the post-racialist worldview loses much of its appeal. 
 16 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 (holding, in a case involving an equal protection challenge to racial 
disparities in capital punishment, that the requirement of discriminatory purpose means proof that the decision 
maker “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ 
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group” (quoting Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (rejecting an equal 
protection challenge to a qualifying test administered to applicants to the police academy and holding that, 
absent proof of discriminatory purpose, even a substantial racially disparate impact “does not trigger the rule 
that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest 
of considerations” (citation omitted)). 
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motive at trial, plaintiffs now have to plead specific facts in the complaint 
showing that motive.17 Because plaintiffs will seldom have access to 
information regarding a defendant’s subjective state of mind prior to discovery, 
presumably fewer equal protection claims will survive motions to dismiss, or 
fewer such claims will be brought in the first place.18 Similarly, the Court’s 
increasingly restrictive standing doctrine raises the bar for many would-be 
equal protection litigants to nearly unattainable heights.19 
The fact that litigation has become an increasingly ineffective means for 
advancing substantive equality in any systematic or structural way could be 
defensible if, in pushing racial minorities out of the courthouse door, one 
believed they could (and should) instead turn to the political process. Yet the 
Supreme Court’s colorblindness doctrine has made it exceedingly difficult for 
racial minorities to actually achieve their goals through the political process. 
As will be discussed in the following Part of this Essay, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly and aggressively struck down racial minorities’ successful use of 
the political process to advance their goals. Thus, having explicitly counseled 
and implicitly required advocates for racial justice to work through the political 
process and having suggested that no real barriers remain to them doing so, the 
Court has simultaneously rendered that process unavailing or, at the very least, 
severely constrained.20 
 
 17 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (holding, in a case alleging racial and religious 
discrimination, that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient factual specificity in his complaint regarding the 
defendant’s subjective state of mind to make his claim sufficiently “plausible” in light of the judge’s “common 
sense” to survive a motion to dismiss). 
 18 See Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism 
Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (2010) (“Under Iqbal, [discrimination] 
claims require a showing of animus or deliberate, invidious intent, which is less likely at the stage where there 
are the fewest facts available, particularly in cases characterized by stark informational asymmetries between 
the parties.”). 
 19 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (holding that parents of African-American public-
school students lacked standing to pursue a claim alleging that the IRS improperly failed to terminate the tax-
exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (holding that 
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a suburban ordinance barring the construction of low- and moderate-
income housing because they had not adequately proven causation, failing, inter alia, to allege that they would 
have been able to afford to live in the suburb even absent the ordinance). Importantly, the Court’s disdain for 
equal protection claims by racial minorities has gone hand in hand with its special solicitude for claims of 
“reverse discrimination” by white plaintiffs. For further discussion of this issue, see William M. Carter, Jr., 
Affirmative Action as Government Speech, 59 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2011). 
 20 As discussed below, this is not a new phenomenon. However, the Court’s willingness to strike down 
laws when minorities have achieved their goals through the political process has increased as the Court has 
grown more conservative. 
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The post-racialist position on judicial review depends heavily upon false 
assumptions regarding minority political power. This Essay interrogates those 
assumptions and argues that they are based largely on sporadic electoral 
success (of which the election of President Obama is but the most obvious 
example), rather than systemic minority political empowerment. Such 
successes are then used as evidence of the descriptive accuracy of post-
racialism. The symbolic legitimacy of such successes is further used as a 
reason for suspicion of the effective exercise of minority political power, i.e., 
to suggest that racial minorities have reached a place of such political 
empowerment that democratic action addressing racial inequality should be as 
constitutionally suspect as laws subordinating racial minorities. I call this 
model of judicial review “whitened scrutiny.” 
As discussed below, the Carolene Products justifications for heightened 
scrutiny21 all depend to a greater or lesser extent on presumed defects in 
majoritarian processes that lead to the enactment of laws burdening 
unprivileged groups. Under whitened scrutiny, the Court assumes the 
applicability of this same reasoning from evidence of racial minorities’ 
increasing but still marginal political representation. For the Court—and a 
substantial number of Americans—majoritarian processes today are considered 
to be as likely to result in discrimination against whites as against racial 
minorities. As a recent study has found, many white Americans view racism 
as a zero-sum game, such that decreases in perceived bias against 
Blacks [since the Civil Rights Era] are associated with increases in 
perceived bias against Whites—a relationship not observed in 
Blacks’ perceptions. Moreover, these changes in Whites’ conceptions 
of racism are extreme enough that Whites have now come to view 
anti-White bias as a bigger societal problem than anti-Black bias.22 
To the extent that the Court’s doctrine generally reflects the popular consensus 
on controversial social issues,23 the Court’s current equal protection 
jurisprudence seems to be in step with public opinion. 
 
 21 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 22 Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game that They Are Now 
Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 215, 215 (2011); accord Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., Let’s Rescue the Race 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at A19 (citing polling data from a survey by the Public Religion Research 
Institute in which 48% of whites, 32% of Hispanics, and 30% of blacks agreed with the statement that 
“discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other 
minorities”). 
 23 See generally PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 
2008) (collecting public opinion data regarding constitutional controversies). 
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL COLORBLINDNESS AS A BARRIER TO  DEMOCRATIC 
ACTION 
The Supreme Court’s current equal protection jurisprudence holds that any 
governmental consideration of race is presumptively unconstitutional.24 The 
Court has held that this is the case regardless of whether the government’s 
action is aimed at aiding or injuring historically subordinated groups.25 
However, the process-defect rationale for strict judicial scrutiny of government 
action is generally inapplicable with regard to laws aimed at remedying the 
subordination of historically oppressed groups. For example, the process-
defect rationale assumes that the disadvantaged group has been effectively shut 
out of the political process due to a combination of its small size and prejudice 
against it.26 This rationale would not, for example, justify heightened judicial 
suspicion of affirmative action measures. Such measures are not adopted by a 
politically empowered majority group to the detriment of politically 
disempowered racial minority groups. To the contrary, such measures are 
enacted by and with the support of a political majority that has freely chosen to 
act in the pursuit of what it sees as the greater good. Should that majority 
change its mind, it would be able to remedy the situation through the political 
process.27 
The Court has nonetheless explicitly and implicitly relied upon process-
defect reasoning in many equal protection cases challenging affirmative action 
programs and other race-conscious measures. The Court’s conservative 
Justices have been highly suspicious of the effective exercise of minority 
political power. The unstated assumption seems to be that political action that 
actually achieves a minority group’s substantive goals is equally as suspicious 
from a process-defect perspective as that of a majority group acting to 
 
 24 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (“[A]ll racial classifications [imposed by 
government] . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” (second and third alterations in 
original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 25 See id. (“We have insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called ‘benign’ racial 
classifications, such as race-conscious university admissions policies, race-based preferences in government 
contracts, and race-based districting intended to improve minority representation.” (citations omitted)). 
 26 See ELY, supra note 8. 
 27 Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating that, 
“[i]f one aspect of the judiciary’s role under the Equal Protection Clause is to protect ‘discrete and insular 
minorities’ from majoritarian prejudice or indifference, some maintain that these concerns are not implicated 
when the ‘white majority’ places burdens upon itself,” but rejecting that argument on the facts of the case 
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938))). 
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disadvantage a minority group. The following sections demonstrate this fear of 
minority political power in action. 
A. The Beginning of the Court’s Suspicion of Minority Political Power: City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.28 was the first affirmative action case 
wherein the Court expressly grounded its equal protection analysis on 
suspicion of the exercise of minority political power. To understand the 
problems with the Croson Court’s reasoning, some background is in order. The 
British colonial institution of slavery began in Virginia in 1619.29 Although it 
was a slaveholding state, Virginia, like other states in the “Upper South,” had 
by the time of the Civil War become less dependent on slavery and therefore 
less extreme and more amenable to compromise with the Union than some 
other slaveholding states.30 During the Reconstruction Era after the Civil War, 
gains were made in Virginia toward ending state-sponsored racial 
subjugation.31 Virginia’s pre-war stance as a relatively moderate Southern state 
did not survive the post-Reconstruction period of racial retrenchment, 
however. Virginia emerged as one of the leaders of the Jim Crow Era, adopting 
a variety of laws aimed at maintaining white supremacy.32 During the civil 
rights movement of the 1940s–1960s, Virginia veered between the virulent 
“Massive Resistance” to racial integration emblemized by politicians such as 
Senator Harry F. Byrd33 and more moderate (yet still segregationist) responses 
to demands for equality.34 
The City of Richmond shared the state’s complicated racial history. 
Richmond was the capital of the Confederacy during most of the Civil War.35 
 
 28 J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469. 
 29 See Tim Hashaw, The First Black Americans, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 29, 2007, at 63, 63. 
 30 See Daniel W. Crofts, Late Antebellum Virginia Reconsidered, 107 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 253 
(1999). 
 31 See Jeff R. Kerr-Ritchie, Black Republicans in the Virginia Tobacco Fields, 1867–70, 86 J. NEGRO 
HIST. 12 (2001) (discussing the improvements in labor laws, education rights, and political access for African-
Americans). 
 32 See, e.g., J. DOUGLAS SMITH, MANAGING WHITE SUPREMACY: RACE, POLITICS, AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
JIM CROW VIRGINIA 24–28 (2002) (describing the adoption of literacy tests, poll taxes, and statewide Jim 
Crow laws from the late 1800s to the early 1900s). 
 33 See Massive Resistance, VA. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.vahistorical.org/civilrights/massiveresistance. 
htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
 34 See Passive Resistance, VA. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.vahistorical.org/civilrights/passiveresistance. 
htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
 35 See EMORY M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE STATE OF RICHMOND: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CAPITAL 
(La. State Univ. Press 1998) (1971). 
CARTER GALLEYS3 8/9/2012  11:02 AM 
2012] THE PARADOX OF POLITICAL POWER 1131 
Black labor was critical to the building (and, after the war, rebuilding) of the 
City.36 White business owners, however, colluded with the city government to 
systematically exclude African-Americans from entrepreneurial 
opportunities.37 Moreover, although Richmond always had a substantial 
African-American population, blacks were effectively locked out of city 
government until the 1970s, when, due to white flight, they became a majority 
of Richmond’s population.38 In 1978, newly empowered black voters and their 
allies elected Richmond’s first African-American mayor and a city council in 
which blacks were a bare majority (five of nine council members).39 Seeking to 
redress the history of African-Americans’ exclusion from the construction 
industry, the city council in 1983 adopted a five-year affirmative action plan, 
under which businesses contracting with the City had to subcontract at least 
30% of a contract’s value to minority business enterprises.40 The plaintiff in 
Croson challenged the plan as violating the Equal Protection Clause.41 
The Supreme Court found the City’s actions unconstitutional.42 Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Croson reduced the complex history of racial 
politics in Richmond described above to a simple case of “reverse 
discrimination” by black government officials against innocent whites.43 While 
Croson’s reasoning purported to rest on equal protection principles of general 
applicability, the plurality clearly believed there was something particularly 
suspicious about the adoption of the plan at issue. The plurality opinion relied 
heavily on process-defect reasoning by emphasizing the fact that the plan was 
adopted by a city council having a black majority.44 To quote from the opinion 
at some length: 
 
 36 See Peter Charles Hoffer, “Blind to History”: The Use of History in Affirmative Action Suits: Another 
Look at City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 23 RUTGERS L.J. 271, 289 (1992) (“Richmond was built, 
repaired, and rebuilt by minority labor.”). 
 37 Id. at 289–91. 
 38 Id. at 290. 
 39 Id. at 290–91. 
 40 Id. at 289. 
 41 488 U.S. 469, 483 (1989). 
 42 See id. at 505–06. 
 43 Id. at 495–96 (plurality opinion). 
 44 See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 50 (2010) (“In Croson, the Court relied on the great John Hart Ely to hold that a 
minority set-aside program was more constitutionally suspect because it had been enacted by a black-majority 
city council.”). It appears that the insinuation of a heavy-handed black majority discriminating against white 
citizens was first made in appellee Croson’s brief. See Brief on Behalf of the Appellee at 8, J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469 (No. 87-998) (“The vote in favor of adopting the Plan was along racial lines with the five black 
members and one of the four white members of the Council voting for it.”). 
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Even were we to accept a reading of the guarantee of equal 
protection under which the level of scrutiny varies according to the 
ability of different groups to defend their interests in the 
representative process, heightened scrutiny would still be appropriate 
in the circumstances of this case. One of the central arguments for 
applying a less exacting standard to “benign” racial classifications is 
that such measures essentially involve a choice made by dominant 
racial groups to disadvantage themselves. . . . 
In this case, [however,] blacks constitute approximately 50% of 
the population of the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the 
city council are held by blacks. The concern that a political majority 
will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on 
unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to militate 
for, not against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny in this 
case.45 
Notice the plurality’s equation of numbers with political dominance and of 
political dominance with a process defect. Because blacks were 50% of the 
City’s population and held 55% of the seats on the city council, they were, in 
the Court’s view, the “dominant” racial group. And because blacks were 
dominant, the plurality reasoned, strict scrutiny was appropriate to protect the 
disenfranchised minority (whites) that was unable to vindicate its goals 
through the political process. 
The Croson plurality’s reliance on process-defect reasoning not only 
discounts the history described above but defies logic and the 
contemporaneous political reality. Percentage of the City’s population tells us 
little about political dominance. Given the relatively lower voter-registration 
and turnout rates in minority communities, it is highly likely that blacks, 
although 50% of the City’s population, accounted for substantially less than 
50% of the registered and actual voters. Thus, even if the black community 
voted as a bloc (another unstated assumption), at least some of the black city-
council members must have enjoyed substantial support from nonblack voters. 
Moreover, the plurality’s recitation of the facts ignores that one of the white 
city-council members voted in favor of the affirmative action plan.46 Finally, 
the plurality’s reasoning assumes that white voters could not have vindicated 
their interests through the political process. At most, the actual facts of the case 
would justify a presumption that black voters in Richmond were in a position 
to use the political process to remedy the legacy of discrimination against them 
 
 45 J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 495–96 (plurality opinion). 
 46 See Brief on Behalf of the Appellee, supra note 44, at 8. 
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by the City of Richmond, not that white voters in Richmond were being 
subordinated by a domineering black majority. 
The Croson plurality’s reasoning reflects a deep concern about the effective 
exercise of minority political power. Croson, however, is less extreme in at 
least one way than the Court’s more recent colorblindness cases, which are 
discussed below. In Croson, a tangible benefit was conferred upon members of 
certain racial groups. As Heather Gerken has noted, the objection to 
government action like that in Croson seems to be that the political majority 
has used its power to engage in unseemly racial self-dealing.47 It is therefore at 
least understandable that concerns about racial patronage might justify 
heightened judicial scrutiny of the political process in a case like Croson.48 In 
the cases discussed in the following sections, however, no such concerns were 
present. Those cases—Ricci v. DeStefano and NAMUDNO—therefore 
represent a qualitative step forward in the Court’s post-racialist jurisprudence. 
B. Fear of a Black Pastor49: Ricci v. DeStefano 
Ricci v. DeStefano50 reflects the Court’s growing suspicion of the exercise 
of minority political power in and of itself. Ricci involved the City of New 
Haven’s efforts to prevent the near-total exclusion of blacks and Latinos from 
promotion to supervisory positions in the City’s fire department.51 By way of 
background, African-Americans and Latinos were approximately 60% of the 
City’s population at the time.52 While blacks and Latinos held 46% of the 
City’s firefighting positions overall, they held only 18% of the captain and 
lieutenant positions in the fire department.53 This lack of representation did not 
arise in a vacuum. Rather, police and fire departments around the country, and 
specifically in New Haven, remained bastions of racial homogeneity well into 
the late twentieth century.54 This was due in part to the perception of public-
 
 47 Gerken, supra note 44, at 54. 
 48 As Professor Gerken also noted, however, where the political process results in the perpetuation of 
white privilege, “[t]he Court routinely dismisses pork and patronage as the usual products of pluralist politics 
under rational basis review. Yet it was markedly alert to the problem of self-dealing in Croson when racial 
minorities ruled.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 49 The subsection title is a reference to the hip-hop group Public Enemy’s seminal album Fear of a Black 
Planet. 
 50 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 51 Id. at 2664. 
 52 Id. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 53 Id. at 2691. 
 54 See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing 
Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 88–89 (2010) (“[New Haven] had been repeatedly and successfully sued 
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safety forces as agents of law and order and to the reluctance of many 
individuals to see persons of color as wielders of such state power, rather than 
the subjects of it.55 Municipal police and fire departments also have long 
histories of perpetuating disproportionate access for white ethnic groups to 
positions in those departments.56 
The lawsuit in Ricci centered on a qualifying exam the City administered 
for promotions to the rank of lieutenant or captain in the fire department.57 The 
test, in conjunction with civil service rules and union agreements governing 
promotions, resulted in significant racial disparities in who would be eligible 
for promotion.58 Out of the seventy-seven firefighters who took the lieutenant’s 
exam, all of those who would have been eligible for immediate promotion 
were white.59 Out of the forty-one firefighters who took the captain’s exam, all 
of those who would have been eligible for immediate promotion were white 
except for two Latinos.60 No blacks were eligible for immediate promotion to 
either captain or lieutenant.61 
Once this racial disparity became apparent, the City’s counsel advised that 
all promotions be put on hold until the City could explore “whether there 
[we]re other ways to test for . . . those [promotions] that [we]re equally valid 
 
by African Americans and Latinos over its hiring and promotional practices—virtually all facially race 
neutral—that operated to shut nonwhites out. . . . Overt and intentional racial exclusion and segregation 
remained pervasive in many urban fire departments even decades after Brown.”). 
 55 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 372 (1987) (“[W]hites are not accustomed to seeing blacks in 
positions of authority or power. . . . [M]any individuals in our culture continue to resist and resent taking 
orders from blacks.”). 
 56 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In making hiring and promotion decisions, 
public employers often ‘rel[ied] on criteria unrelated to job performance,’ including nepotism or political 
patronage. Such flawed selection methods served to entrench preexisting racial hierarchies.” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted) (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 1817 (1972))); Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A 
Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581, 588–95 (2010) (tracing the history of exclusion 
of white women and racial minorities from firefighting jobs in New Haven and other urban fire departments, 
and the resultant desegregation and discrimination lawsuits); The Ladder, SLATE (June 25, 2009, 7:17 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2221250/entry/2221298/ (“[A]s New Haven’s black population swelled [beginning in 
the 1960s and 1970s], the city’s Irish, Italian, and Polish residents held tight to power and dug in over hiring in 
the fire department.”). 
 57 129 S. Ct. at 2664. 
 58 Id. at 2665–66. 
 59 Id. at 2666. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
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with less adverse [racial] impact.”62 His legal concern was that proceeding 
with promotions could give rise to liability under the disparate impact 
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.63 City officials also had 
political concerns. New Haven’s pattern of racial discrimination in the fire 
department had previously prompted lawsuits and public outrage.64 As in the 
past, black and Latino firefighters would have had a reasonable prima facie 
claim of disparate impact liability had the promotion process at issue in Ricci 
gone forward, given the level of the racial disparity.65 On this occasion, 
however, minority firefighters and their allies chose—at least initially—to seek 
political redress, rather than file a lawsuit. 
The City held a series of public hearings at which individuals spoke on 
both sides of the issue. Firefighters as well as members of the general public 
urged the Civil Service Commission not to make any promotions because of 
concerns about unfairness and racial exclusion.66 A local minister, Reverend 
Boise Kimber, emerged as one of the most vocal opponents of going forward 
with the promotions.67 Reverend Kimber, in addition to being an influential 
minister and community activist, was also a member of the New Haven Board 
of Fire Commissioners, which set rules and regulations for the fire 
department.68 Reverend Kimber “adamantly opposed certification of the test 
results” because of their racially disparate impact.69 At the conclusion of the 
 
 62 Id. at 2669–70 (second alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix at 140, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 
(Nos. 07-1428, 08-328)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63 Id. Title VII prohibits both disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) and disparate impact (racial 
disparities caused by facially neutral employment practices). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 64 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2691 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the prior litigation involving New 
Haven’s fire department); Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 54, at 89–91 (same). 
 65 Indeed, the disparate impact lawsuits that the city counsel feared manifested immediately after the 
Supreme Court mandated that the City proceed with the racially exclusionary promotions in Ricci. Black 
firefighters filed two disparate impact lawsuits once those promotions were made. See William Kaempffer, 
Black Firefighter Files Federal Bias Suit, NEW HAVEN REG., Oct. 16, 2009, at A1; William Kaempffer, City 
Facing More Suits from Firefighters, NEW HAVEN REG., Nov. 13, 2009, at A3. 
 66 Lieutenant Gary Kinney, for example, stated that basing promotions on the results of this test would be 
“a slap in the face” to the firefighters who did not receive passing scores, because he believed the material 
tested was not sufficiently pertinent to firefighting in New Haven. Joint Appendix, supra note 62, at 44–45. He 
continued, “this test showing that no minorities passed” is “not going to work. It’s going to cause more 
[divisiveness].” Id. at 46. 
 67 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2684–85 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 68 Id. at 2684. As Justice Ginsburg noted, the Board of Fire Commissioners was a separate and 
independent body from the Civil Service Board, which made the decision regarding the promotions. Id. at 
2709 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 69 Id. at 2685–86 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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hearings, the City ultimately decided not to certify the results, leading to no 
promotions being made.70 
The disappointed firefighters sued, alleging that the City’s actions violated 
the disparate treatment provisions of Title VII because they were race 
conscious.71 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that of Title VII’s two 
prongs—disparate impact and disparate treatment—the latter generally trumps 
the former.72 Borrowing from its affirmative action jurisprudence under the 
Equal Protection Clause, the Court held that Title VII generally prohibits an 
employer from voluntarily “tak[ing] adverse employment actions because of an 
individual’s race”73 to correct for a cognizable disparate impact on persons of a 
different race.74 Rather, the employer must prove not only that the business 
practice at issue causes a substantial racial disparity but also that the employer 
has a strong basis in evidence to believe it would lose a disparate impact 
lawsuit if one were brought.75 
Given that no promotions were made, there was no formal unequal 
treatment in Ricci.76 Contrary to the popular narrative of the case, the plaintiffs 
 
 70 Id. at 2671 (majority opinion). The City’s Civil Service Board was responsible for certifying the list of 
applicants who passed the test, from which the candidates for promotion would be chosen. Id. at 2665. At the 
end of a series of public hearings, the Board split 2–2 with regard to whether to certify the test results, with the 
consequence that the list was not certified and no promotions could be made. Id. at 2671. 
 71 See id. at 2664. 
 72 See id. 
 73 Id. at 2673. 
 74 See id. at 2675 (“[In the context of the Equal Protection Clause, t]he Court has held that certain 
government actions to remedy past racial discrimination . . . are constitutional only where there is a ‘strong 
basis in evidence’ that the remedial actions were necessary. . . . Our cases discussing constitutional principles 
can provide helpful guidance in this statutory context.” (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 500 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Justice Scalia went further, suggesting in his 
concurrence that disparate impact statutes may be unconstitutional. See id. at 2682–83 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
He argued that the theory of disparate impact liability requires employers to act in a race-conscious manner 
because, to avoid or remedy a racially disparate impact, one must first notice the racial disparity and 
subsequently take action to correct it. See id. at 2682. Justice Scalia suggested that, because the Court’s equal 
protection precedents generally prohibit the government itself from acting in a race-conscious manner, it may 
also be unconstitutional for the government to require others to do so. See id. at 2682–83. 
 75 Id. at 2678 (majority opinion). As the Court explained, a prima facie Title VII disparate impact case is 
established by the existence of a statistically significant racial disparity. Id. Such a disparity does not 
automatically prove disparate impact liability, however; it is only the first step. As the Court explained, “[T]he 
City could be liable for disparate-impact discrimination only if the examinations were not job related and 
consistent with business necessity, or if there existed an equally valid, less-discriminatory alternative that 
served the City’s needs but that the City refused to adopt.” Id. 
 76 See id. at 2696 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[City officials] were no doubt conscious of race . . . , but 
this did not mean they had engaged in racially disparate treatment. . . . ‘[A]ll the test results were discarded, no 
one was promoted, and firefighters of every race will have to participate in another selection process to be 
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in Ricci were not deprived of a vested right to promotion.77 At best, they—like 
all the other firefighters—were deprived of the opportunity to be considered 
for promotions at that time based on the results of that test.78 Thus, Ricci 
differs from a case like Croson, which involved a traditional affirmative action 
plan.79 
The Court’s ruling showed deep suspicion of black political power. Most 
fundamentally, the Court mistakenly “equate[d] political considerations with 
unlawful discrimination.”80 The Court essentially found that successful black 
political advocacy that temporarily prevented the perpetuation of racial 
exclusion amounted to reverse discrimination against whites. It reached this 
conclusion despite the fact that no promotions were made at all and the fact 
that making the promotions likely would have violated then-existing law.81 In 
essence, Ricci treats a racial minority group’s success in using ordinary politics 
to prevent its continued subordination and exclusion as presumptively illegal. 
Justice Alito’s concurrence made plain his view that whites in New Haven 
needed judicial protection from black political power. In his view, the City 
refused to certify the test results not to avoid Title VII liability—or even to 
 
considered for promotion.’” (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 
158 (D. Conn. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2658); see also Helen 
Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 197, 245 (2010) (“Mr. Ricci was not treated differently than any other firefighter based on race, 
and in fact was not treated differently than any other firefighter at all: the test results were discarded for all, 
regardless of race, and no one was promoted, regardless of race.”). Indeed, the district court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ equal protection claim in Ricci in part because no unequal treatment occurred. Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 
2d at 161. 
 77 See Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 161 (“[P]erforming well on the exam does not create an entitlement to 
promotion . . . .”). 
 78 See id. at 160 (“Even [if the Civil Service Board had certified the test results], application of the [civil 
service rules] would [only] give top scorers an opportunity for promotion, depending on the number of 
vacancies, but no guarantee of promotion; it is even conceivable that the applicant with the highest score never 
would be promoted.”). 
 79 As Justice Ginsburg noted in dissent, it is for this reason that the “litigation d[id] not involve 
affirmative action” as traditionally defined. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The equal 
protection cases from which the Ricci Court drew the strong-basis-in-evidence standard all involved 
affirmative action measures by which the government distributed a tangible benefit on the basis of race. 
 80 Id. at 2709. 
 81 Id. at 2673 (majority opinion). Prior to Ricci’s novel application of the strong-basis-in-evidence 
standard to Title VII claims, an employer faced with evidence of a statistically significant racial disparity could 
voluntarily take corrective action to prevent that disparity from occurring without being subject to disparate 
treatment liability. See Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[W]here an exam that 
discriminates against a group or groups of persons is reviewed, studied and changed in order to eliminate, or at 
the very least, alleviate such discrimination, there is a complete absence of intentional discrimination.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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level the playing field—but instead to please the black community.82 For 
Justice Alito, the City’s actions were grounded solely in “a simple desire to 
please a politically important racial constituency.”83 Even assuming this were 
true, nowhere does Justice Alito’s opinion explain why this is a forbidden goal 
in politics.84 Indeed, as explained in Part I above, the Court’s conservative 
members’ repeated calls for subordinated groups to use the political process to 
achieve their goals assumes that doing so is not only permissible but desirable. 
Justice Alito’s narrative of the facts, moreover, emphasized what he saw as 
the sinister role of a single African-American minister whom he believed 
subverted the political process. Justice Alito, selectively quoting the district 
court’s opinion, implied that “city officials worked behind the scenes to 
sabotage the promotional examinations because they knew that, were the 
exams certified, the Mayor would incur the wrath of [Rev. Boise] Kimber and 
other influential leaders of New Haven’s African-American community.”85 It 
seems unlikely that Justice Alito’s imagery of radical black “wrath” and 
“sabotage” was merely an unfortunate choice of words. The characterization of 
the black community’s successful political advocacy as dangerous and 
subversive reflects a worldview in which the normal tools of politics—
vigilance, agitation, and the threat of political repercussions—are ominous 
when successfully wielded by persons of color.86 It is supremely ironic that the 
Ricci Court condemned black ethnic politics for successfully interrupting the 
 
 82 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2688 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 83 Id. 
 84 After all, the fact “[t]hat political officials would have politics in mind is hardly extraordinary, and 
there are many ways in which a politician can attempt to win over a constituency—including a racial 
constituency—without engaging in unlawful discrimination.” Id. at 2709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 85 Id. at 2684 (Alito, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 
142, 162 (D. Conn. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2658) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). Justice Alito failed to quote the remainder of this portion of the district court’s 
opinion, which stated that, even if a jury could draw such an inference, “the fact that defendants desired to 
avoid the wrath of one group (in this case African-American firefighters and other political supporters of 
Kimber and DeStefano) does not logically lead to the conclusion that defendants intended to discriminate or 
retaliate against plaintiffs because they were not members of that group.” Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 163. 
 86 Whatever can be said about Reverend Kimber as an individual, finding it suspicious or even 
particularly unusual that a black minister would loudly and even disruptively protest what he saw as 
discrimination against his community reflects a deep unfamiliarity with the role of the black church in the 
politics of racial justice. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Separation of Church and Self, 46 SMU L. REV. 585, 
588–89 (1992) (“The battle for racial equality . . . was a mass movement . . . . And yet, the movement’s 
support base for much of its existence was in the church. The leaders of the mass-protest wing were drawn 
from the black clergy, which continues to supply a disproportionate share of the civil rights leadership.”); see 
also Emily Bazelon, Ricci’s Competing Story Lines, SLATE (June 29, 2009, 2:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
id/2220927/entry/2221780 (“Boise Kimber has plenty of unsavory bits in his past. Alito runs through many of 
them. Because in his view, the evil to be protected against in New Haven is black political power.”). 
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perpetuation of racial exclusion brought about by white ethnic politics, while 
leaving the latter wholly unexamined. 
C. Fear of a Black Vote: Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number 
One v. Holder87 
If Croson and Ricci are supportable from the perspective of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, it cannot be because blacks were so politically 
dominant in either Richmond or New Haven that whites were effectively a 
disenfranchised minority. But perhaps judicial suspicion of the political 
process could be justified in those cases because of the level of government 
involved. Local governments are thought to be distinctly dangerous sites for 
government decision making based upon race because local governments are 
less broadly representative than the national government and therefore more 
subject to racially distorted politics.88 Even if that were true in Ricci and 
Croson, however, the Court’s decision in NAMUDNO shows that it considers 
minority political power equally suspicious at the national level. 
NAMUDNO involved a challenge to the constitutionality of section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, as renewed in 2006.89 Section 5 requires that 
certain covered jurisdictions obtain preclearance from the federal government 
prior to the enforcement of any changes to their voting practices or 
procedures.90 Congress adopted this provision as a prophylactic measure to 
supplement the other provisions of the Act, which allow for case-by-case 
litigation of discrimination in voting.91 By requiring federal oversight of any 
changes in voting procedures by those jurisdictions found to have engaged in 
 
 87 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
 88 See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990) (noting that there is a “heightened 
danger of oppression from political factions in small, rather than large, political units” and that, “as a matter of 
‘social reality and governmental theory,’ the Federal Government is unlikely to be captured by minority racial 
or ethnic groups and used as an instrument of discrimination” (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469, 522–23 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), 
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 89 129 S. Ct. at 2508. The Voting Rights Act contains a sunset provision providing that section 5 shall 
expire if not renewed by a given date. See id. at 2510 (“As enacted, §§ 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were 
temporary provisions. They were expected to be in effect for only five years. . . . Congress reauthorized the 
Act in 1970 (for 5 years), 1975 (for 7 years), and 1982 (for 25 years). . . . Most recently, in 2006, Congress 
extended § 5 for yet another 25 years.”). 
 90 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). The covered jurisdictions are mostly, but not exclusively, located in 
the South. 
 91 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). 
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systematic voting discrimination in the past, Congress “decide[d] to shift the 
advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.”92 
The lawsuit in NAMUDNO was brought by a municipal utility district 
located in Texas, a covered jurisdiction.93 The District had an elected board 
and believed that it should not be subject to the preclearance requirement 
before it could make changes to its election procedures.94 In the normal course 
of events, it is unlikely that a small municipal utility district would expend the 
effort and expense necessary to mount a constitutional challenge and litigate it 
all the way to the Supreme Court. Indeed, as noted by the district court in 
NAMUDNO: 
Throughout its two decades of existence, the District has filed only 
eight preclearance requests, and the cost of these submissions—$223 
per year—is modest, especially when compared to the District’s 
average annual budget of $548,338. . . . [M]oreover, the District has 
never received an objection letter or been targeted by a section 5 
enforcement suit. Nor has the District identified a single voting 
change that it considered but chose not to pursue because of 
section 5.95 
The Utility District in NAMUDNO, however, was luckier than most plaintiffs. 
Although opposed by the county in which it was located,96 it had the good 
fortune of being represented by (among others) the Project on Fair 
Representation, a conservative litigation firm whose mission is ending 
affirmative action and other governmental measures aimed at increasing 
diversity or integration.97 The District’s post-racial argument that the level of 
black political success today renders section 5 both unnecessary and 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey (NAMUDNO), 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 223 (D.D.C. 
2008), rev’d sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
 94 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2508. 
 95 573 F. Supp. 2d at 282 (citations omitted). 
 96 See id. at 278 (“[F]or the County, the modest administrative costs that come with being subject to 
Section 5’s preclearance requirements are far outweighed by the benefits that come from such coverage.” 
(quoting Travis County’s Motion for Summary Judgment, with Accompanying Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities at 7, NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (No. 06-1384))). 
 97 See Current Litigation, PROJECT ON FAIR REPRESENTATION, http://www.projectonfairrepresentation. 
org/current-litigation/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). Despite the euphemistic language on its website and in its 
press releases, it is clear from the Project’s actual litigation and briefs filed therein that its goal is to attack 
race-conscious measures adopted for remedial or diversifying purposes. The Project, for example, was also 
involved in litigating the successful equal protection challenge to school districts’ voluntary school-integration 
efforts in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). See 
Current Litigation, supra. 
CARTER GALLEYS3 8/9/2012  11:02 AM 
2012] THE PARADOX OF POLITICAL POWER 1141 
unconstitutional was presented front and center in the first paragraph of its 
brief: 
In the past 44 years, nearly every facet of voting rights has 
changed in America. Voter registration, voter turnout, and 
representation in electoral offices have increased dramatically among 
African Americans, Hispanics, and other minorities. The country has 
its first African-American president, who received a larger 
percentage of the white vote than each of the previous two 
Democratic presidential nominees.98 
The Court, applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, sidestepped 
the constitutional issues and resolved the case on statutory grounds.99 But in 
lengthy dicta clearly intended as a warning to Congress, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion strongly signaled that several members of the Court, if not 
yet a majority, are prepared to find section 5 unconstitutional. The Court stated 
that section 5 “raise[s] serious constitutional questions”100 in an opinion 
suffused with post-racialist assumptions about minority political power. The 
opinion reasoned that section 5 may no longer be necessary because “[t]hings 
have changed in the South. Voter turnout and registration rates now approach 
parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And 
minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.”101 After offering only 
the briefest of nods to the fact these improvements are due in no small part to 
section 5,102 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion then used evidence of minority 
political success as reason for suspicion of the fruits thereof. In the Chief 
Justice’s view, the “dramatic improvement[]” in minority access to the vote 
undermined the justification for section 5’s continued existence.103 Indeed, 
under this view, the overwhelming majorities in Congress by which section 5 
was reenacted in 2006 (390–33 in the House and 98–0 in the Senate104) serve 
not as reason for upholding it, but for striking it down. If racial minorities are 
powerful enough to have such legislation enacted, then why do they need it? 
 
 98 Appellant’s Brief at 1, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322). 
 99 See NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2513–17. The Court, applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, 
ruled as a matter of statutory interpretation that the District was entitled to seek “bailout” from section 5’s 
preclearance requirement and that it was therefore unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues. Id. 
 100 Id. at 2513. 
 101 Id. at 2511. 
 102 See id. (“These improvements are no doubt due in significant part to the Voting Rights Act itself, and 
stand as a monument to its success. Past success alone, however, is not adequate justification to retain the 
preclearance requirements.”). 
 103 Id. at 2511–12. 
 104 Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322). 
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Furthermore, for some of the Justices, such successful political advocacy 
by racial minorities is reason for the same kind of suspicion displayed in Ricci: 
the intuition that racial intimidation, rather than legitimate and ordinary 
politics, was at work. The following excerpt from the oral argument in 
NAMUDNO is illustrative: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: . . . . What was the vote on this 2006 extension—
98 to nothing in the Senate, and what was it in the House? Was— 
[COUNSEL]: It was—it was 33 to 390, I believe. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: 33 to 390. You know, the—the Israeli Supreme 
Court, the Sanhedrin, used to have a rule that if the death penalty was 
pronounced unanimously, it was invalid, because there must be 
something wrong there. Do you ever expect—do you ever seriously 
expect Congress to vote against a reextension of the Voting Rights 
Act? Do you really think that any incumbent would—would vote to 
do that?105 
Justice Thomas would have gone farther than the majority and held 
section 5 unconstitutional. For Justice Thomas, the time has come for racial 
minorities to cease to be the “special favorite[s] of the law[]”106 with regard to 
 
 105 Id. at 47–48. Justice Scalia was echoing the contemporary conservative movement’s suspicion of the 
politics behind the reauthorization of section 5. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Voting Rights Act Under Siege, 
POLITICO (Feb. 19, 2012, 7:06 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73058.html (“An intensifying 
conservative legal assault on [section 5 of] the Voting Rights Act [is taking place] . . . . [T]he view that states 
should have free rein to change their election laws even in places with a history of Jim Crow seems to be 
gaining traction within the Republican Party.”); see also Edward Blum, An Insulting Provision, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE (May 2, 2006, 6:42 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/217511/insulting-provision/edward-
blum (“[T]he Republican congressional leadership, cheered on by the Bush Administration, is hell-bent on 
keeping [section 5] in place. . . . Republicans don’t want to be branded as hostile to minorities, especially just 
months from an election.”). Like the majority in Ricci, Justice Scalia did not explain why enacting legislation 
to please this particular constituency must be seen as particularly unprincipled or suspicious, as compared to 
legislative action undertaken to please other important and politically active constituencies, such as gun 
owners and the elderly. 
 106 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court held that 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited racial segregation in places of public accommodation, exceeded 
Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. In NAMUDNO, Justice Thomas argued that 
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act exceeded Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. 129 S. Ct. 
at 2517 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Nor is Justice Thomas alone in 
this regard; Chief Justice Roberts clearly also believes that the time for racial remediation has passed. See 
Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy, NEW YORKER, May 25, 2009, at 42, 42–44 (“[I]n a series of decisions 
in the past four years, the Chief Justice has expressed the view that the time has now passed when the Court 
should allow systemic remedies for racial discrimination.”). It is remarkable how similar the reasoning of 
contemporary post-racialists is to that of the post-Reconstruction Supreme Court, which routinely struck down 
democratically enacted measures designed to promote racial equality. But perhaps it should not be remarkable. 
Recent scholarship has shown that the narrative that “we have done enough” arose immediately following the 
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the right to vote. In his concurring opinion, he argued that “the violence, 
intimidation, and subterfuge that led Congress to pass § 5 and this Court to 
uphold it no longer remains.”107 Because, in his view, section 5 represents 
federal “[p]unishment for long past sins,”108 rather than a legitimate response 
to contemporary discrimination and the political legacy of past discrimination, 
it is unconstitutional.109 
III.  THE WAY FORWARD 
This Essay has argued that the Supreme Court’s post-racialist jurisprudence 
treats the effective exercise of minority political power as inherently 
suspicious. The Court has distorted the traditional justifications for 
countermajoritarian judicial action in service of a narrative of pervasive white 
victimization. Its decisions reflect a worldview in which the primary problem 
of racial injustice today is discrimination against whites by virtue of insidious 
minority political power. In this final Part, I suggest ways in which the Court’s 
colorblindess doctrine should be modified to better reflect the realities of 
minority political power and to allow the political process to function properly. 
A. Changing the Narrative 
Recent scholarship has argued that the Court’s colorblindness doctrine is as 
concerned with the expressive function of race-conscious government action as 
with its instrumental effects.110 Richard Primus has called this the “visible-
 
Civil War and has been continuous thereafter. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 
WASH. U. L. REV. 917, 928–37 (2009) (discussing the recurring historical pattern of resistance to civil rights 
efforts). 
 107 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2527 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 108 Id. at 2525. 
 109 Subsequent to the Court’s decision in NAMUDNO, several new challenges to the constitutionality of 
section 5 were filed. Two of the district courts in these new cases have found section 5 to be constitutional. See 
LaRoque v. Holder, No. 10-0561 (JDB), 2011 WL 6413850 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2011); Shelby County v. Holder, 
811 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.D.C. 2011). In two other cases that remain pending, the courts have not yet reached a 
decision on the merits. See Arizona v. Holder, No. 11-01559 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 25, 2011); Florida v. United 
States, No. 11-01428 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 1, 2011). The Supreme Court has also reiterated in a recent per 
curiam opinion that at least some Justices continue to believe that section 5 raises “serious constitutional 
questions.” Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 942 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2513) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In light of these developments, it seems very likely that the Court will soon 
directly confront the question of section 5’s constitutionality. 
 110 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 19 (stating that the Court’s colorblindness doctrine is grounded in 
concerns about the message sent by remedial or diversifying race-conscious government action and arguing 
that the Court should therefore incorporate First Amendment principles into its analysis in such cases); Richard 
Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s concern in 
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victims” reading of the colorblindness doctrine.111 The Court condemns 
government action redressing racial inequality when such action creates visible 
white victims around whom a narrative consistent with post-racialism can 
revolve.112 As Primus has argued, “One predictable way for the race-conscious 
aspect of a governmental practice to acquire a divisive social meaning is for 
the practice to create visible victims. Visible victims lend themselves to easily 
understood narratives of injustice, as every good plaintiffs’ lawyer knows.”113 
The visibility of individual white victims provides a rallying point for 
resentment; once such resentment manifests, the Court’s conservatives contend 
that the government’s action (rather than whites’ reaction) threatens social 
cohesion and is therefore unconstitutional.114 
I believe that this worldview persists because, when racial minorities 
exercise their political power to level the playing field, they often do so in 
ways that create visible, individual white “victims” who are perceived as 
paying the price for something that is not their fault. Subordination of racial 
minorities, however, is often accomplished in ways that render individual 
victims invisible. Accordingly, when racial minorities use the political process 
to interrupt the perpetuation of white privilege, we falsely see a world in which 
a politically dominant group (racial minorities) is discriminating against 
discrete and identifiable victims (individual whites). By contrast, because the 
continued subordination of racial minorities is often systemic and its causes are 
often invisible, it is seen as being “just the way things are.” 
One possible way to combat the narrative of insidious minority political 
power would be to present a counternarrative highlighting continued racial 
inequality. Both in litigation and in the public debate, it should never go 
 
cases like Ricci is with the divisive social meaning that the Court believes is sent by government action 
explicitly redressing racial inequality); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An 
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011) (identifying the 
antibalkanization principle as an independent doctrinal middle ground between colorblindness theory and 
antisubordination theory, under which government action violates the Equal Protection Clause when it is seen 
as causing divisiveness and threatening social cohesion). 
 111 See Primus, supra note 110, at 1369–74. 
 112 See id. at 1372. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See Siegel, supra note 110, at 1298 (noting that Justices have treated the “resentment of the 
‘dispreferred’ [i.e., whites] as a reason to impose restrictions on race-conscious remedies”). This reasoning 
treats the government’s action, rather than the reaction thereto, as the cause of the problem. As I have written 
elsewhere, the Court’s colorblindness doctrine “has embraced a kind of heckler’s veto theory, long formally 
discredited in free speech jurisprudence, whereby the fact that government attention to racial inequality 
offends some individuals or allegedly creates divisiveness is sufficient to prohibit the message.” Carter, supra 
note 19, at 57. 
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unremarked that racial minorities (particularly blacks and Latinos) are at or 
near the bottom of the scale by nearly every material measure115 and that racial 
minorities’ increasing electoral success falls well short of systemic political 
empowerment.116 But the Court’s colorblindness doctrine currently has little 
room for arguments based on racial remediation or for data regarding political 
empowerment. Indeed, evidence of continued racial disparities was directly 
presented to the Court in Croson, Ricci, and NAMUDNO, only to be cursorily 
dismissed because it contradicted the Court’s preferred narrative of those 
cases. 
In Croson, for example, the City relied on a variety of evidence to defend 
its decision to adopt the affirmative action plan at issue, including 
statistics showing that minority-owned businesses have received 
virtually no city contracting dollars and rarely if ever belonged to 
area trade associations; testimony by municipal officials that 
discrimination has been widespread in the local construction industry; 
and . . . exhaustive and widely publicized federal 
studies . . . show[ing] . . . pervasive discrimination in the Nation’s 
tight-knit construction industry.117 
The Court concluded, however, that such legislative fact finding was “of little 
probative value in establishing identified discrimination in the Richmond 
construction industry.”118 In Ricci, abundant evidence was presented to the 
Court regarding pervasive racial discrimination in municipal employment in 
general and in New Haven in particular.119 The majority opinion completely 
disregarded such evidence, reducing the case to the simple proposition that 
“[t]he City rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring candidates 
were white.”120 And in NAMUDNO, the Court was presented with voluminous 
evidence—including over 27,000 pages of combined fact finding by the House 
and Senate—of continued voting discrimination justifying the reenactment of 
 
 115 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 116 Indeed, a recent study has found that, in the South, despite the presence of substantial numbers of 
minority legislators, “[b]lack voters and elected officials have less influence now than at any time since the 
civil rights era,” due to racially polarized voting and race-based redistricting that dilutes black voters’ 
influence. DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES, RESEGREGATION IN SOUTHERN 
POLITICS? 1 (2011), available at http://www.jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/upload/research/files/ 
Resegregation%20in%20Southern%20Politics.pdf. 
 117 488 U.S. 469, 529 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 118 Id. at 500 (majority opinion). 
 119 See 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690–92 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 120 Id. at 2674 (majority opinion). 
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section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.121 The NAMUDNO opinion failed to 
address this evidence directly, stating only that “[i]t may be that . . . conditions 
continue to warrant preclearance under the Act. But the Act imposes current 
burdens and must be justified by current needs.”122 Thus, efforts to render the 
subordination of racial minorities visible are unlikely to draw much sympathy 
from the current Supreme Court. 
A second option would be for racial minorities and their allies to continue 
to use the political process to address racial inequality, but to do so in ways 
that avoid creating visible white victims. In a case like Croson, for example, 
the city council could have created an affirmative action program based not 
upon race but upon socioeconomic disadvantage, or the number of previous 
City contracts a business had received, or some combination of other factors 
that would correlate closely with the race of previously excluded groups.123 
Similarly, in Ricci, the City of New Haven could have used facially neutral 
measures to avoid the racial disparity in promotions from occurring in the first 
place.124 But the Court has proven adept at finding equal protection violations 
even in situations where no identifiable white individuals have been harmed in 
any tangible way.125 Avoiding creating visible white victims therefore will not 
by itself provide a safe haven for the exercise of minority political power. 
Thus, while changing the narrative is important, it will be insufficient 
without an accompanying doctrinal shift. I suggest that equal protection review 
incorporate an initial analysis that I call “process scrutiny.” To the extent that 
the Court’s suspicion of minority political power is grounded in process-defect 
reasoning, the Court should scrutinize not just the goals and methods of the 
 
 121 See 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 228–30, 250–68 (2008), rev’d sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One 
v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
 122 129 S. Ct. at 2511–12. 
 123 The disadvantage of such methods is that they would only imperfectly address racial disparities 
because such proxies would not correspond exactly to the underlying racial disparities. Moreover, focusing on 
class or other factors, rather than calling attention to the continued racial and structural aspects of inequality, 
cedes the ground for debate to the post-racialists. See, e.g., Barnes et al., supra note 3, at 1001 (“[T]here is 
something disingenuous and distasteful about not calling racism out for what it is—about buying into the myth 
that the United States is post-race.”). 
 124 Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ricci explicitly stated that employers could take such measures 
notwithstanding Ricci’s holding. See 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (“Title VII does not prohibit an employer from 
considering, before administering a test or practice, how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair 
opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race.”). 
 125 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that strict scrutiny applied to a state redistricting 
plan that created a majority-black voting district, even though white voters made no claim that the district 
diluted whites’ voting strength or otherwise caused a tangible injury). 
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challenged governmental action but also the political process that led to the 
governmental action at issue. 
B. Changing the Doctrine: Process Scrutiny 
Current equal protection jurisprudence holds that any purposeful 
government consideration of race triggers strict scrutiny.126 Under strict 
scrutiny, the courts are to closely examine both the government’s ends and 
means. The reviewing court is to assess the importance of the government’s 
goal to determine whether it is sufficiently compelling to justify the use of 
race.127 Even if the goal is compelling, strict scrutiny also requires that the 
government’s means be narrowly tailored or the least restrictive method of 
achieving the compelling goal.128 Thus, race-conscious government action is 
presumptively unconstitutional and will be upheld only in a very few cases.129 
To the extent that the Court is suspicious of minority political power and 
therefore believes that process-defect reasoning is applicable in such cases, I 
suggest the addition of a preliminary step to the equal protection analysis. Prior 
to the application of strict scrutiny in cases where racial minorities have used 
the political process to enact legislation directed toward remedying the effects 
of past discrimination or otherwise leveling the playing field, the courts should 
scrutinize the political process that led to the decision in question, not merely 
the end result. To be sure, some Justices believe that strict scrutiny itself 
accomplishes this purpose. In Adarand, for example, Justice O’Connor wrote 
that strict scrutiny is designed 
to “smoke out” illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the 
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use 
of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen 
‘fit’ this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility 
 
 126 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995). 
 127 See id.  
 128 See id.  
 129 In Adarand, the Court noted that it “wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, 
but fatal in fact.’” Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in the judgment)). Thus, while strict scrutiny will almost always result in the government’s action 
being declared unconstitutional, there are limited circumstances in which it will be upheld. See, e.g., Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s consideration of race as a 
“plus” factor in admissions decisions). 
CARTER GALLEYS3 8/9/2012  11:02 AM 
1148 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1123 
that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice 
or stereotype.130 
However, this presumes the invalidity of the process from the results and then 
scrutinizes the results to see if they are both important enough and precise 
enough to “warrant use of a highly suspect tool.” Treating the results of the 
political process as “highly suspect” makes sense when reviewing the outcome 
of majoritarian processes subordinating racial minorities, because rationales 
other than or in addition to process-defect theory justify such suspicion. For 
example, we presume that laws burdening racial minorities are likely to reflect 
“prejudice and antipathy”131 because of the history of racism and white 
supremacy.132 These factors, combined with the group’s numerical 
disadvantage, serve as a proxy for a process defect. 
Such presumptions make no sense, of course, when the political process 
yields results aimed at redressing racial inequality. Rather, the sole 
instrumental justification for the “extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process”133 embodied by strict scrutiny would be that the 
political process has malfunctioned in such a way as to effectively exclude a 
racial group, i.e., whites. This is the point that Justice Alito was attempting to 
make, however inaccurately, in his concurrence in Ricci. But rather than 
assuming a process defect ipse dixit, the courts should actually and directly 
scrutinize the political process leading to the challenged action to ascertain 
whether it malfunctioned. 
Such process scrutiny134 would have two elements, one empirical and one 
interpretive. The first would be an empirical examination of the processes 
 
 130 515 U.S. at 226 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality 
opinion)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 131 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 132 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (commenting that “a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment” of the minority group counsels in favor of applying strict scrutiny). 
 133 Id. 
 134 The term “process scrutiny” has previously appeared in the scholarly literature in the context of the 
Takings Clause. See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen, The Abstruse Science: Kelo, Lochner, and Representation 
Reinforcement in the Public Use Debate, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 375, 411–12 (2008) (advocating that courts 
scrutinize the process by which a takings decision was reached as a way of determining whether “procedural 
irregularities” or “improper influence” have distorted the political process). While the goal of such process 
scrutiny is different in that context—exposing when a putative public purpose for a taking is a pretext for an 
underlying desire to benefit a private party—the task it performs is somewhat similar here. However, rather 
than seeking to expose a pretextual explanation for government action, I use “process scrutiny” to indicate a 
judicial examination of the political process with an eye toward whether a process defect has occurred such 
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leading to the challenged decision. Some key points of inquiry would include 
whether the decision was reached by virtue of open and transparent 
proceedings, whether dissenting views (if any) of both the citizenry and public 
officials were expressed in a forum that could reasonably be expected to take 
them into account, and whether socioeconomic or other disparities can be said 
to have effectively diminished the voice of those who disagreed with the 
governmental action. In other words, was the political process actually 
working properly? 
The second element would involve interpreting what actually happened 
with an eye toward the perceived fairness of the processes leading to the 
challenged decision. Factors for examination would include whether the result 
would reasonably be perceived as reinforcing the dominance of one group, 
whether dissenting voices would reasonably be perceived as sufficiently 
marginalized that they would have exited the political process, and whether the 
political process would reasonably be perceived as having been illegitimately 
captured by one racial group. In other words, would the political process have 
been perceived as actually working properly?135 
To take one example, applying such an analysis to the facts of Ricci would 
yield the result that there was no reason to be particularly suspicious about the 
effective exercise of minority political power in New Haven. As to the first 
inquiry, it is clear that the political process actually functioned properly in 
Ricci. The decision not to certify the test results was made by governmental 
actors responding to the kinds of political pressure from ordinary citizens that 
are the workings of ordinary politics. New Haven’s procedures required that 
the Civil Service Board (CSB) certify a list of applicants who would be eligible 
 
that the exercise of minority political power should be subject to strict scrutiny. Future articles will more fully 
develop the contours of such process scrutiny. 
 135 I realize that both elements that I propose involve some degree of subjectivity, as there is no single 
completely objective set of criteria against which to judge whether the political process has actually 
malfunctioned or would reasonably be perceived as having malfunctioned. Cf. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 
901–02 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court’s vote-dilution jurisprudence 
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by arguing that “there are undoubtedly an infinite number of theories 
of effective suffrage, representation, and the proper apportionment of political power in a representative 
democracy that could be drawn upon to answer the questions posed in [vote-dilution cases]” but noting that 
“such matters of political theory are beyond the ordinary sphere of federal judges” and “are not readily 
subjected to any judicially manageable standards that can guide courts in attempting to select between 
competing theories”). Nonetheless, the application of some actual standards for determining when the political 
process has malfunctioned is preferable to current doctrine, which presupposes the existence of a process 
defect without the benefit of any rigorous examination of the underlying processes or even of logical 
presumptions arising from a history of discrimination against the allegedly disadvantaged group. 
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for civil service positions.136 Once the controversy over the test results erupted, 
the CSB, which is an “autonomous body of City of New Haven citizens,”137 
held a series of five open hearings at which members of the public as well as 
governmental officials spoke for and against certifying the results.138 The CSB 
heard testimony “from test takers, the test designer, subject-matter experts, 
City officials, union leaders, and community members,”139 including 
individuals and organized interest groups. In addition to the transparency of the 
formal process, the matter was very much in public view and part of the public 
discourse in New Haven at the time.140 Moreover, the City’s board of aldermen 
(the elected city council) was also briefed on the situation, providing yet 
another venue for community input and participation. In short, Ricci involved a 
public matter roundly debated in public fora, providing opportunities for 
democratic engagement. At the end of the process, democratically accountable 
officials, acting in a politically responsive fashion, took a position on a 
political controversy. 
The political process in Ricci also likely would have been perceived as 
functioning properly. Although members of the community may have 
vehemently disagreed as to the proper substantive outcome, it is unlikely that 
whites in New Haven would have reasonably perceived the political process to 
be so dominated by minority interests or otherwise closed to them that they 
were effectively denied procedural justice. Whites were well represented in 
city government, and the final decision on certification—a 2–2 split by the 
CSB—belies the impression of minority subversion or capture of the city 
government. It may have been true that blacks and Latinos were “a politically 
 
 136 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 (2009). 
 137 Civil Service, CITY OF NEW HAVEN, http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/HumanResources/ 
CivilService.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
 138 See Joint Appendix, supra note 62. It is worth noting that these hearings were held over the initial 
protest of Rev. Kimber, who apparently would have preferred that the Board of Fire Commissioners first have 
the opportunity to meet privately with the CSB, which does much to dispel the notion that the process operated 
through secret back-room dealing. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2685 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Reverend Kimber 
protested the public meeting, arguing that he and the other fire commissioners should first be allowed to meet 
with the CSB in private.”). 
 139 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2692 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 140 For example, the issue was thoroughly covered in the local media. See, e.g., William Kaempffer & 
Angela Carter, City Fire Tests Have No Easy, Cheap Fix, NEW HAVEN REG. (Feb. 2, 2004), http://www. 
nhregister.com/articles/2004/02/02/import/10901527.txt; William Kaempffer, Fire Department Sure to Be 
Sued over Exams, NEW HAVEN REG. (Feb. 6, 2004), http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2004/02/06/import/ 
10927406.txt; William Kaempffer, Fire Exams Pose Problems, City Lawyer Says, NEW HAVEN REG. (Jan. 23, 
2004), http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2004/01/23/import/10855004.txt; William Kaempffer, Firefighters 
Say Tests for Promotions Are Flawed, NEW HAVEN REG. (Jan. 21, 2004), http://www.nhregister.com/articles/ 
2004/01/21/import/10840559.txt. 
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important racial constituency” in New Haven,141 that a local black minister 
apparently had the ear of the mayor,142 and that city officials and the CSB were 
persuaded for political reasons not to certify the test results. Nonetheless, in 
light of the history of racial minorities’ political and social subordination, it 
remains difficult to see how these facts could reasonably be perceived as 
amounting to a systemic defect in New Haven’s democratic processes unless 
successful political advocacy is itself grounds for suspicion. It is inconsistent 
(to say the least) for the Court’s conservative members to view political 
influence as especially pernicious in itself when it leads to racially egalitarian 
political outcomes, while simultaneously believing that, in the context of 
corporate campaign contributions, it is legitimate for politicians to “respond by 
producing those political outcomes the supporter favors.”143 
CONCLUSION 
If current demographic projections are correct, racial minorities will be a 
numerical majority in America by the middle of this century.144 As that shift 
begins, racial minorities in many areas of the country will increasingly hold 
political power while continuing to face social and economic subordination. 
Newly empowered minority groups will presumably use the political process 
to enact laws aimed at ameliorating continued racial inequality. 
Although the popular narrative of constitutional history views the federal 
judiciary—and especially the Supreme Court—as the champions of racial 
equality, the Court has more often acted in countermajoritarian ways to 
obstruct racial progress than to advance it.145 As racial minorities use the 
 
 141 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2688 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 142 Id. at 2684. 
 143 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 
(2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876). 
 144 See Minorities Expected to Be Majority in 2050, CNN (Aug. 13, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-
08-13/us/census.minorities_1_hispanic-population-census-bureau-white-population?_s=PM:US. 
 145 See William M. Carter, Jr., Judicial Review of Thirteenth Amendment Legislation: “Congruence and 
Proportionality” or “Necessary and Proper”?, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 973, 988 (2007) (“[While] Congress was 
girding for [the Civil W]ar . . . , enacting the Reconstruction Amendments after the war’s end, and enforcing 
them during the brief Reconstruction period via a variety of civil rights measures that were incredibly 
progressive for their time[, ]the Supreme Court was issuing rulings that were protective of the white 
supremacist regime Congress was attempting to dismantle.”); Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the 
Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 154 (1995) (“The claim that the judiciary is the exclusive or even dominant 
protector of our liberties is a very recent and mistaken idea, one that has arisen principally in the civil liberties 
community in the last generation. This view of constitutional structure comes from the experience of Brown v. 
Board of Education and the moral authority of that decision.” (footnote omitted)). 
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political process to vindicate their goals, an activist federal judiciary will more 
often prove to be an obstacle to racial justice than a vehicle for it, as long as it 
remains uniquely suspicious of minority political power. 
 
